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NOTE
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE FAIR
HOUSING ACT: TRAP FOR THE UNWARY
The Fair Housing Act of 19681 was enacted "to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States." 2 The original intent of the statute was to prohibit, with certain
limitations and exceptions, 3 racial discrimination in housing; the scope
4
of the Act has since been extended to proscribe sex discrimination.
The Act provides for enforcement by any person who believes he
will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing practice. The
person aggrieved may file a written complaint with the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 5 or may file a civil action
in any appropriate state, local, or federal district court.6 In either
case, the complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination.7 If the person complains to HUD under section 3610, the
Secretary may attempt to resolve the complaint "by informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."8 Since HUD is restricted
to seeking voluntary compliance, section 3610(d) preserves the complainant's right to commence a civil action in federal district court if
the Secretary has not obtained voluntary compliance within thirty
days.9
This note concerns conflicting judicial and administrative interpretations of that portion of section 3610(d) which describes the time
limitation in which a complainant may institute a civil action after
first seeking the aid of HUD. That section provides, in pertinent part:
1. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1970)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
3. See notes 46-49 and accompanying text infra.
4. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b), 88 Stat. 729 (1974).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
6. Id. § 3612.
7. Id. § 3610(b); § 3612(a).
8. Id. § 3610(a). If a state or local fair housing law provides rights and remedies
which are "substantially equivalent" to those provided by the Fair Housing Act, the
Secretary must refer the complaint to the appropriate state or local administrative
agency and take no further action unless he determines that "the protection of the
rights of the parties or the interests of justice" so require. Id. § 3610(c).
9. Id. § 3610(d). No civil action may be brought in federal district court if
"substantially equivalent" rights and remedies are available under state or local law.
Id. This restriction does not apply to a plaintiff who elects to bypass administrative
aid in prosecuting his claim and goes directly to the federal district court. Id. § 3612.
These provisions have been criticized for penalizing the complainant who seeks administrative help. See Note, Racial Discrimination in the Private Housing Sector: Five
Years After, 33 MD. L. REv. 289, 301-03 (1973). See also Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REv. 834, 855-59 (1969).

FAIR HOUSING ACT

1977]

(d) If within thirty days after a complaint is filed with the Secretary . . . the Secretary has been unable to obtain voluntary com-

pliance with this subchapter, the person aggrieved may, within
thirty days thereafter, commence a civil action in any appropriate
United States district court, against the respondent named in the
complaint, to enforce the rights granted or protected by this subchapter .

.

. .10

The section appears to state that the right to file an action in court
arises thirty days after the date when the complainant files his complaint with HUD, and remains viable for only thirty days. Stated
another way, the section requires that a complainant who first seeks
help from HUD must file his civil action, if at all, between the thirtyfirst and sixtieth days following the date he files with HUD.
HUD regulations suggest a very different conclusion:
The person aggrieved shall be notified in writing by registered or
certified mail when the Assistant Secretary has determined that he
is unable to obtain voluntary compliance through informal methods
of conference, conciliation, or persuasion. The 30 days provided in
section 810(d) [42 U.S.C. § 3610(d)] title VIII within which a civil
action may be commenced shall be deemed to begin upon the
receipt of such notice."'
The regulation reflects a recognition that HUD's investigation of
the complaint and subsequent activities seeking voluntary compliance
are unlikely to produce a result within thirty days. Unless Congress
intended that HUD's conciliatory measures be conducted concurrently
with the complainant's court action, HUD's participation would be
meaningless in most cases if the complainant were required to file
his civil action between the thirty-first and sixtieth days following the
filing of his complaint with HUD. The effect of the regulation is to
delay the beginning of the period in which the complainant may file
his action in the federal district court until he receives notification
that HUD has been unable to obtain voluntary compliance.
Five reported cases, all in federal district courts, 12 have discussed
whether the HUD regulation properly interprets the statute. Brown
v. Ballas and Logan v. Richard E. Carmack & Associates interpreted
10. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970) (emphasis added).
11. 24 C.F.R. § 105.34 (1976).
12. Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Fla. 1976); Brown v. Blake & Bane,
Inc., 402 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1975); Logan v. Richard E. Carmack & Assocs., 368 F.
Supp. 121 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C.
1972); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
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section 3610(d) to mean that a suit brought pursuant to that section
must be filed within thirty days of the plaintiff's receipt of notice that
HUD has terminated efforts to obtain voluntary compliance.'- Sumlin
v. Brown, Young v. AAA Realty Co., and Brown v. Blake & Bane, Inc.
held that the statute was not susceptible of that interpretation. Instead,
the latter decisions ruled that civil actions must be filed, if at all, no less
than thirty and no more than sixty days after the complaint is filed
with HUD-regardless of whether HUD has terminated its concilia4
tion efforts or whether HUD has notified the plaintiff of termination.1
Read together, the Ballas and Logan cases offer three reasons for
holding that the HUD regulations properly interpret section 3610(d):
(1) plaintiffs should not be penalized for the failure of administrative
agencies to follow statutory mandates; (2) the limitations of section
3610(d) are analogous to the limitations contained in former 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e), 15 previously a portion of the Fair Employment Practices
Act; and (3) Congress did not intend that administrative and judicial
proceedings pursuant to the Fair Housing Act should proceed
simultaneously. None of these reasons withstands analysis.
The primary fault with the first reason is that the time limits in
section 3610(d) do not relate to any notice which HUD is required
to give the plaintiff. Rather, the date of reference is the date when
the complaint was filed with the Secretary. 6 Section 3610 requires HUD
to give notice to a complainant only if the Secretary determines, within
thirty days of receiving the complaint, that HUD will not seek to
resolve the complaint; 17 the statute does not require notice that HUD
has terminated its conciliatory efforts. Nevertheless, HUD does advise
complainants that they will receive notice of termination and that
they may file suit under section 3610(d) within thirty days of receipt
of the notice.'
One court has reasoned that plaintiffs should be able to rely on
such communications, and in any case should not be penalized for
13. The Ballas court went even further, requiring the defendant to bear the
burden of showing that plaintiff received notice from HUD more than thirty days
before filing suit. 331 F. Supp. at 1035-36.
14. See Brown v. Blake & Bane, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 621, 622-23 (E.D. Va. 1975)..
15. (1970).
16. See note 10 and accompanying text supra. Section 3610(d) also refers to "any
period of reference under subsection (c) of this section." Subsection (c) concerns
referral of the complaint to local or state agencies. See note 9 supra. The reference to
subsection (c) has no impact on the legal issues, although in practice the limitation
period might be affected. In order to simplify this discussion, the date of filing with
HUD will be treated as the reference date in all cases.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
18. Letter from HUD to Lt. Otis Sumlin (Dec. 2, 1975) (copy on file with court
in Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Fla, 1976)).
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properly following directions.' 9 Acceptance of that argument, however,

effectively allows an administrative agency to repeal, through rulemaking, a legislatively mandated statute of limitations upon which
defendants should be entitled to rely. 20 That is not a valid purpose of
interpretative rulemaking. 21 Furthermore, decisions such as Ballas
and Logan serve to perpetuate HUD's erroneous interpretation of the
statute, an interpretation which has the long-term effect of diminishing
22
plaintiffs' rights under the statute.
The Logan court attempted to justify its holding by drawing an
analogy between section 3610(d) and the limitation period imposed
on claims brought under the Fair Employment Practices Act prior to
its amendment in 1972.23 Under those provisions, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was required to give notice
to the complaining party if it failed to achieve voluntary compliance
within thirty days after the complaint was filed; the complaining
24
party could, "within thirty days thereafter," institute a civil action.
This was interpreted to mean only that the complaining party must
bring suit, if at all, within thirty days of receiving notice that EEOC
failed to obtain voluntary compliance, and not that he must bring
suit within sixty days of filing his complaint with EEOC.25 Former
section 2000e-5(e) required EEOC to give notice of termination. The

19. Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
20. For example, in the Sumlin case, plaintiffs received their "right to sue" letter
nearly nineteen months after filing their complaint with HUD. See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
21. See generally 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.05 (1958).
22. See text accompanying notes 35-38 infra.
23. Logan v. Richard E. Carmack & Assocs., 368 F. Supp. 121, 122-23 (E.D. Tenn.
1973). The pre-1972 version of the Fair Employment Practices Act provided in pertinent
part:
If within thirty days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within
thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) (except
that in either case such period may be extended to not more than sixty days
upon a determination by the Commission that further efforts to secure voluntary
compliance are warranted), the Commission has been unable to obtain voluntary
compliance with this title, the Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved
and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the
respondent named in the charge (1) by the person claiming to be aggrieved, or (2) if
such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the
charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.
Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 260 (1964) (current version
at 42 U.s.C. § 2000e-5 (1976)).
24. Id.
25. Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Cunningham v. Litton
Indus., 413 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1969).

132
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courts were unwilling to restrict the rights of complainants because
the agency failed to fulfill its statutory duty.26
The analogy would be persuasive if section 3610(d) contained a
requirement that HUD give notice of failure to obtain voluntary compliance within a given period of time. The section does not, however,
contain such a requirement.27 As noted above, the only notice requirement in section 3610 is the requirement that HUD notify the complainant within thirty days whether the agency intends to attempt
to resolve the matter.2 8 As Judge Warriner remarked in Brown v.
Blake & Bane, Inc.:
[T]he notice required by § 2000e-5(e) is a notice that the government has tried and failed and thus has terminated its efforts at
conciliatory compliance. The notice in 3610(a) is a notice that the
government intends to commence conciliatory intervention. Thus,
notice under the Fair Employment Practices Act carries an import
29
just the opposite of the notice under the Fair Housing Act.
The cases which hold that HUD has properly interpreted section
3610(d) assume that it would be irrational-at least that Congress
did not intend-for a civil action under the Fair Housing Act to
proceed concurrently with administrative proceedings concerning the
same complaint. 0 Several portions of the act indicate, however, that
simultaneous proceedings are exactly what Congress intended. Section
3610(f) provides that HUD must terminate its efforts to obtain voluntary compliance when an action filed pursuant to either section 3610 or
section 3612 comes to trialA1 Section 3610(f) therefore contemplates
that HUD's activities may proceed throughout the pretrial stages of
the civil action. Section 3612(a) further provides that an action brought
pursuant to that section or section 3610(d) may be continued by the
26. Delay in sending notice could occur without any breach of duty by EEOC.
Although former § 2000e-5(e) required that notice be given if voluntary compliance
was not obtained within thirty days, the statute did not specify a period of time in
which the notice must be sent. See note 23 supra; Miller v. Int'l Paper Co., 408 F.2d
283, 286 n.12 (5th Cir. 1969).
27. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
28. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
29. Brown v. Blake & Bane, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 621, 623 (E.D. Va. 1975) (emphasis
in original).
30. See Logan v. Richard E. Carmack & Assocs., 368 F. Supp. 121, 123 (E.D. Tenn.
1973).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(f) (1970). Thus the federal district courts need not be burdened
with cases which they expect to be settled by HUD, but complainants need not wait
long periods of time before being allowed to enforce their claims in court. See Young
v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382, 1386 (M.D.N.C. 1972); Sumlin v. Brown, 420
F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
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court "if the court believes that the conciliation efforts of the Secretary . . . are likely to result in satisfactory settlement [of the dis,,2
criminatory housing practice] ....

Proponents of the HUD regulation have suggested that if complainants are allowed to file suit within sixty days of -filing their
complaints with HUD, the agency's activities regarding the complaint
will become "meaningless formalities. ' 3' 3 The suggestion assumes that
alleged violators will be less willing to comply voluntarily with the
Fair Housing Act once an action has been filed.34 The Sumlin court
concluded that the opposite was true: the plaintiff's opportunity to
file his action thirty days after complaining to HUD-and the actual
filing-would serve as an incentive for voluntary compliance.3 5 The
trial judge reasoned that
[a]llowing the plaintiff to file suit while HUD continues to seek
voluntary compliance ensures that a defendant cannot delay resolution of the dispute indefinitely by refusing to cooperate with HUD,
secure in the knowledge that the plaintiff cannot seek legal redress
until HUD has abandoned the case. The present case provides
ample evidence that such delays could be substantial. Plaintiffs
filed their complaint with HUD on May 29, 1974; they received
their "right to sue" letter on December 24, 1975-over 1 2 years
30

later.

Since section 3610(d) provides no limits on the length of time HUD
may expend in seeking voluntary compliance, a complainant who requested HUD's assistance would be wholly unable to control the
progress of his complaint if he could not file his action in court before
HUD terminated its activities. A skillful defendant might be able
to delay proceedings for years through manipulation of his negotiations with HUD.
The argument comes full circle; the rationale behind the Ballas
decision becomes the rationale for the opposite conclusion. The Ballas
court concluded that a plaintiff is unfairly penalized because of administrative misinterpretation of the statute if his Fair Housing Act
claim is dismissed because it is brought too late as a result of following
HUD's instructions. But all Fair Housing Act plaintiffs are penalized
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a) (1970); see Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382,
1386 n.3 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
33. Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
34. Id.
35. Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
36. Id. at 82.
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if HUD's regulation is allowed to control, because defendants can
use the regulation to delay the proceedings.
A plaintiff may bring his Fair Housing Act claim directly to court
without first complaining to HUD 3 7 thereby avoiding the delays implicit in the regulation. Thus a plaintiff might be placed at a disadvantage as a result of seeking administrative help in resolving his
claim. Since that help is provided to avoid the expense and delay of
trial, 3 it makes little sense to discourage resort to the administrative
process. That is, however, precisely the long-term effect which the
HUD regulation appears to have.
The immediate legal effect of dismissing a claim brought under
section 3610(d) for failure to comply with the time limitations of the
section will be minimal in most cases. As both the Young and Sumlin
courts noted,-9 dismissal of the claim brought under the Fair Housing
Act does not affect the validity of the same claim when it is subsequently brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1982.40 Less than three
months after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, the United States
Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.41 that section

1982 prohibits private as well as public racial discrimination in the
sale or rental of property.4 2 The Jones Court further held that the
remedies available under section 1982 and the Fair Housing Act are
independent of each other, and that the Fair Housing Act does not
limit the scope of the earlier statute.4 3 In subsequent decisions the
courts have specifically ruled that the limitations period of section
3610(d) does not apply to an action brought under section 1982.With the exception of sex discrimination, the coverage and remedies
of section 1982 are generally broader than those of the Fair Housing
Act.4 5 The Fair Housing Act does not apply to transactions involving
37. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
38. See Sumlin v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
39. Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382, 1387 (M.D.N.C. 1972); Sumlin
v. Brown, 420 F. Supp. 78, 82 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
41. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
42. Id. at 413. The statute was construed as enforcing the thirteenth amendment,
thus avoiding the fourteenth amendment requirement of state action.
43. Id. at 416 n.20.
44. Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973); Hampton v. Roberts, 386
F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Va. 1974). The limitation period applicable to § 1982 suits is
the state statute of limitations which would be applied to a similar action brought in
state court. Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d at 857; Warren v. Norman Realty Co., 513
F.2d 730, 733 (8th Cir. 1975).
45. See Note, The Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act, 1969 DuKE L.J. 733, 756-60. But see Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth

1977]

FAIR HOUSING ACT

single-family dwellings sold or rented by an owner, 6 or to transactions
involving portions of "dwellings containing living quarters occupied
or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living
47
independently of each other" if the owner lives in such a building.
Religious organizations and private clubs are likewise exempt. ' Section 1982 recognized no exemptions. Under the Fair Housing Act,
punitive damages are limited to $1,000;49 punitive damages are not
limited by section 1982. A plaintiff may not sue in federal district
court under the Fair Housing Act if he first complains to HUD
and substantially equivalent relief is available under local law.- This
restriction does not apply to a plaintiff who brings his suit pursuant
to section 1982.
Although the Fair Housing Act authorizes the award of attorney's
fees to a prevailing plaintiff, 51 section 1982 is silent on the subject.
Attorney's fees under the Fair Housing Act, however, are available
only when the court determines that the plaintiff is financially unable
to pay them.5 2 Until recently courts have awarded attorney's fees in
section 1982 suits under their equity powers. 53 Congress has now
specifically authorized the award of attorney's fees in section 1982
suits in the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976.r
The availability of section 1982 ameliorates the disadvantage
suffered by most plaintiffs as a result of reliance on the HUD regulation. But sex discrimination, which is explicitly covered by the Fair
Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1019, 1031
(1969), which suggests that incidental aspects of real estate transactions might be covered
by the Fair Housing Act but remain outside the scope of § 1982. Examples include
brokerage contracts, advertising of discriminatory preferences, and financial arrangements. These incidents are specifically within the contemplation of the Fair Housing
Act but may not be "property" for the purposes of § 1982. The Fair Housing Act
also explicitly prohibits blockbusting, which may or may not be within the reach
of § 1982. See id. at 1032; Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L.J. 170, 175-76 (1970); Note, Legal
Control of Blockbusting, 1972 URBAN L. ANN. 145.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1). The Fair Housing Act does apply, however, if the
owner owns more than three such houses or, after December 31, 1969, if the sale or
rental involves a real estate broker or salesman. Id.
47. Id. § 3603(b)(2).
48. Id. § 3607.
49. Id. § 3612(c).
50. Id. § 3610(d); see note 9 supra.
51. Id. § 3612(c).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
But see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 270 nA6
(1975) (dictum), in which the Supreme Court specifically disapproved the "private
attorney general" theory used to support the award of attorney's fees in Lee.
54. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
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Housing Act,5 5 is not prohibited by section 1982.56 In states without
statutes that prohibit sex discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing,57 the Fair Housing Act provides the only avenue for bringing
a sex discrimination claim. If such a claim is extinguished through
failure to file a court action within the time limits of section 3610(d),
HUD's advice concerning those time limits is no longer harmlessly
misleading. The plaintiff will have lost substantial legal rights through
administrative misinterpretation of the statute.
Further, even for those plaintiffs who retain the right to pursue
their claims under section 1982, the regulation tends to convert HUD's
administrative aid from a help into a hindrance.5s The effect of the
regulation is to prolong the process of resolving the complaint and to
remove, for a time, the pressure for out-of-court settlement which a
plaintiff may apply by threatening court action.5 9 The Fair Housing
Act instructs HUD to facilitate the resolution of housing discrimination complaints." That purpose is poorly served by a regulation which
leads complainants into unintentional loss of their claims.
EDWARD PHILLIPS NICKINSON, III
55. Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 808(b), 88 Stat. 729 (1974).
56. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Justice Stewart emphasized
that § 1982 deals solely with racial discrimination in the sale or rental of property. Id.
at 413.
57.

See Note, Pioneering Approaches to Confront Sex Bias in Housing, 24 CLav.
n.27 (1975).
See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
See text accompanying note 36 supra.
See 42 U.S.C. § 3608 (1970).

ST. L. REv. 79, 84

58.
59.
60.

